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TAX COMMENT
Editor-THEODORE S. WECKER.
INHERITANCE TAXATION-TRANSFERS IN CONTEMPLATION OF
DEATH-CONSTITUTIONAL LA.-"In matters of taxation, the prob-
lem of the government has always been to compel the gracious yield-
ing of the unwilling taxpayer to its sovereign power." 1 It is not
startling, therefore, that inheritance and death transfer tax statutes
have met with much circumvention and interposition in the form of
the practice of disposing of property by gifts inter vivos. The Rev-
enue Acts of 1916,2a 1918,2b 1921,2c and 1924 2d included sections the
dominant purpose of which was to reach substitutes for testamentary
dispositions and thus to prevent the evasion of the estate tax.3 The
method adopted by these sections proved ineffective in its practical
administration with a great loss to the government in consequence, 4
and section 302 (c), 5 accordingly, was adopted. The most recent
expression of the Supreme Court, in Heiner v. Donnan,6 however,
declared the second sentence of this section unconstitutional.7
In this case, the facts were as follows: One Donnan died within
two years after transferring by complete and irrevocable gift inter
vivos certain securities to trustees for his four children, and after
advancing a sum of money to his son. Both transactions were with-
out consideration. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue included
'Harrow, Summary Procedure Against Transferees Uifder the Revenue
Acts of 1926 and 1928 (1930) 5 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 11, 11.2a REV. ACT OF 1916 §202 (b), c. 463, 39 STAT. 756, 778.
"b REv. AcT OF 1918 §402 (c), c. 18, 40 STAT. 1057, 1097.
2c REV. Ac OF 1921 §402 (c), c. 136, 42 STAT. 227, 278.
d REv. AcT op 1924 §302 (c), c. 234, 43 STAT. 353, 304 (26 U. S. C. A.
§1094, note).
'See U. S. v. Wells, 283 U. S. 102, 116, 117, 51 Sup. Ct. 446, 451 (1930),
citing Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U. S. 531, 47 Sup. Ct. 710 (1926) and Milliken
v. U. S., 283 U. S. 15, 51 Sup. Ct. 324 (1930).
'Justice Stone, in his dissenting opinion in Heiner v. Donnan, - U. S. -,
52 Sup. Ct. 358, 363, at 367, 368 (1932), compiled the following statistics: "102
cases, decision of which was determined by the answer to the question of fact,
whether a gift had been made in contemplation of death have arisen; in 20
cases involving gifts of approximately $4,500,000 the government was success-
ful; in 78 involving gifts largely in excess of $120,000,000, it was unsuccessful;
in another the jury disagreed." See also Housa REP. No. 1, 69th Cong. 1st
Sess. at 15.
' REv. AcT OF 1926 §302 (c), c. 27, 44 STAT. 9, 70 (26 U. S. C. A. §1094
[c]). This section provides in part as follows: "Sec. 302. The value of the
gross estate of the decedent shall be determined by including the value at the
time of his death of all property * * *
"(c) * * * [2d sentence] Where within two years after his death *** and
without such a consideration, the decedent has made a transfer, * * * such
transfer shall be deemed and held to have been made in contemplation of
death * * *"'
IHeiner v. Donnan, - U. S. -, 52 Sup. Ct. 358 (1932).
Supra note 5.
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in the gross estate of decedent the value of the property transferred,
imposing a death transfer tax on authority of section 302 (c). De-
spite the declaration of the second sentence of this section that "such
transfers shall be deemed and held to have been made in contempla-
tion of death," the trial Court found as a fact that neither the transfer
in trust nor the advancement was made in contemplation of death.
Judgment was rendered against the commissioner on the ground the
second sentence of Section 302 (c) was unconstitutional, and viola-
tive of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Supreme
Court affirmed this decision, Justices Stone and Brandeis dissenting.
This ultimate fate of section 302 (c) was presaged by several
antecedent cases. In the lower courts, five decisions declared, in
similar situations, the unconstitutionality of this provision.8  The
Kentucky Court of Appeals declared invalid a provision of the Ken-
tucky Statutes, which was parallel in form and purpose with the
provision under discussion.9 The Supreme Court foretold its deci-
sion in two of its own opinions, Schlesinger v. Wisconsin 10 and
United States v. Wells.1
A Wisconsin statute 12 which provided that all gifts made within
six years shall be conclusively presumed to have been made in con-
templation of death was the subject of the Scdesinger case. The
facts in this case were found to be that Schlesinger died testate,
leaving a large estate; that within six years he had made four sepa-
rate gifts aggregating more than five million dollars to his wife and
three children; that none of these was really made in view, anticipa-
tion, or contemplation of death. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin
defended the presumption and consequent taxation on the theory that,
exercising judgment and discretion, the legislature found them neces-
sary in order to prevent evasion of inheritance taxes.' 3 In an opin-
ion, written by Justice McReynolds, the Supreme Court answered
this argument by stating that it was equivalent to declaring that "A
may be required to submit to an exactment forbidden by the Consti-
tution if this seems necessary in order to enable the state readily to
collect lawful charges against B." 14 As to this, the Court there
continued:
'Donnan v. Heiner, 48 F. (2d) 1058 (D. C. W. D. Pa. 1931); Hall v.
White, 48 F. (2d) 1060 (D. C. D. Mass. 1931); Guinzburg v. Anderson, 51 F.(2d) 582 (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1931); Delaware Trust Co. v. Handy, 51 F. (2d)
867 (D. C. D. Del. 1931); Guinzburg v. Anderson, 54 F. (2d) 629 (C. C. A.
2d, 1931).
'State Tax Comm. v. Robinson's Executor, 234 Ky. 405, 28 S. W.
(2d) 491 (1930). An inheritance tax statute (Ky. STATS. §4281 a-I, subsec.
2), providing that a gift, if made within three years of donor's death, shall be
deemed taxable as made in contemplation of death, was declared unconstitu-
tional, the Court stating that to justify an inheritance tax, it must be proved
that the gift, whenever made, was actually in contemplation of death.
"0 Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U. S. 230, 46 Sup. Ct. 260 (1925).
" U. S. v. Wells, 283 U. S. 102, 51 Sup. Ct. 446 (1930).
§1087-1, c. 64ff, Wis. STATs. (1919).
11 184 Wis. 1, 199 N. W. 951 (1924).
"Supra note 10, 270 U. S. at 240, 46 Sup. Ct. at 261.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
"Rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution are not
to be so lightly treated; they are superior to this supposed
necessity. The state is forbidden to deny due process of the
laws for any purpose whatsoever." 15
"A forbidden tax cannot be enforced in order to facili-
tate the collection of one properly laid." 16
The power of Congress or of a state to provide for including in the
gross estate of a decedent, for purposes of a death tax, the value of
gifts made in contemplation of death, and their power to create a
rebuttable presumption in this respect, was not denied in this case.
The Court decided against that part of the statute that made the
presumption conclusive "without regard to actualities"; that classify-
ing gifts made during a specified period as made in contemplation of
death was an arbitrary exertion of a power.
It remained, however, for the Wells case 17 to disperse the doubts
concerning the true definition of the phrase "in contemplation of
death." The Government there agreed that the early decisions 18 con-
strued the words "in contemplation of death" as referring only to
gifts causa mortis, but claimed that this definition had been aban-
doned in favor of more liberal constructions, pointing toward a ten-
dency on the part of the legislatures and the Courts to broaden the
meaning in order that the tax might be made effective. The Court
said, however, that "while the interpretation of the phrase had not
been uniform, therie has been agreement upon certain fundamental
considerations": 19
1. "It is recognized that the reference is not to the gen-
eral expectation of death which all entertain. It must be a
particular concern giving rise to a definite motive." 191 (Ital-
ics ours.)
2. "The motive must be of the sort which leads to testa-
mentary disposition." 19b
3. "It is sufficient if contemplation of death be the induc-
ing cause of the transfer, whether or not death is believed to
be near." 19c
4. "The statute does not embrace gifts inter vivos which
spring from different motives. Such transfers were made the
subject of a distinct gift tax, since repealed." 19d
l Ibid.
' Supra note 11.
See cases collected in 7 A. L. R. 1028, 21 A. L. R. 1335.
' Supra note 11, 283 U. S. at 115, 51 Sup. Ct. at 451.
"a Ibid. 283 U. S. at 115, 51 Sup. Ct. at 451.
"lb Ibid. 283 U. S. at 117, 51 Sup. Ct. at 451.
1c Ibid. 283 U. S. at 119, 51 Sup. Ct. at 452.
I'd Ibid. 283 U. S. at 118, 51 Sup. Ct. at 452.
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5. "The provision is not confined to gifts cauia
mortis."19e
6. Whether the motive is present should be determined
from the surrounding circumstances, the "bodily and mental
condition" of the donor at the time of the transfer, the period
between the transfer and death, etc. 19f
The Wells case dealt with a rebuttable presumption, 20 but Heiner
v. Donnan involved a conclusive presumption. One of the issues
which split the Supreme Court in Heiner v. Donnan 21 was whether
the tax was intended as a death transfer tax or a tax in pure gifts
inter vivos, for if it were the latter, the tax laid might not be uncon-
stitutional. Speaking through Justice Sutherland, the majority said:
"The statute requires that this value shall be determined
as of the time of the decedent's death, without regard to the
value of the gift when received. The event upon which the
tax is made to depend is not the transfer of the gift, but the
transfer of the estate of the decedent. The tax falls upon the
estate and not upon the gift, and is computed not upon the
value of the gift, but by progressively graduated percentages,
upon the value of the entire estate. It is * * * apparent * * *
that Congress could not have had, even remotely, in mind the
imposition of a gift tax." 22
This the minority, in an opinion delivered by Justice Stone, stoutly
denied:
"At the outset it is to be borne in mind that gifts inter
vivos are not immune from federal taxation." 23
" * * the obvious and permissible purpose of the present
and related sections" is to tax gifts inter vivos.2 4
" * * * It is not imperative that the motive of the donor
be made the exclusive basis of the selection of these gifts for
taxation." 25
"The gifts taxed may, in some instances, * * * bear no
relation whatever to death, except that all are near death." 26
It is submitted, however, that the evolution of the present statute, the
transformation of a prina facie presumption into a conclusive pre-
1'e Ibid. 283 U. S. at 115, 51 Sup. Ct. at 451.
'OfIbid. 283 U. S. at 117, 51 Sup. Ct. at 451.
"' Supra note 2 (d).
2'Supra note 6.2
-Ibid. 52 Sup. Ct. at 362, 363.
Ibid. 52 Sup. Ct. at 364.
' Ibid. 52 Sup. Ct. at 365.
Ibid. 52 Sup. Ct. at 366.
- Ibid. 52 Sup. Ct. at 366.
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sumption, tends to indicate that the taxing intention has retained its
identity, and since pure gifts inter vivos were not included in the early
history of the statute 27 it is more logical to argue that they are not
now included in section 302 (c).
The majority opinion goes even further, asserting that even "if
construed as imposing a gift tax, it is in that respect still so arbitrary
as to cause it to fall within the ban of the due process clause * * *," 28
citing as the basis of its conclusion Schlesinger v. Wisconsin.29 The
latter case adopted the view of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin,30
stating:
"The court below declared that a tax on gifts inter vivos
only could not be so laid as to hit those made within six years
of the donor's death and exempt all others-this would be
'wholly arbitrary.' We agree with this view * * **" 31
The minority, however, points out the question involved in Heiner v.
Do-nnan 32 was not involved in. the Schlesinger case, distinguishing
between the two cases:
"There, all gifts made within six years of death were
taxed. Here, only those within the statute. There, the tax
was a successive tax, and so was a burden on-right to receive,
Leach, v. Nichols, 286 U. S. -, 52 Sup. Ct. 338 (1932), and
necessarily payable by the donee, but at rates and valuations
prevailing at the time of the donor's death. Here the tax was
upon the transfer effected by the donor's gift after the enact-
ment of the statute, and is payable from the donor's estate at
the same rates and values as though it had passed at his
death." 3
The minority opinion, further, points toward many decisions in which
similar taxation of gifts made inter vivos was sustained.3 4 Further,
-*Supra note 2.
28 SJpra note 6, 52 Sup. Ct. at 362.
-l"9 S;a note 10.
Estate of Schlesinger, 184 Wis. 1, 199 N. W. 951 (1924).
"Supra note 10, 270 U. S. at 239, 46 Sup. Ct. at 261.
Supra note 6.
Ibid. 52 Sup. Ct. 365.
'Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U. S. 124, 50 Sup. Ct. 46 (1029) (a statute
taxing all gifts inter vivos at the same rates and with the same exemptions as
in the case of testamentary transfers was upheld) ; Tyler v. U. S., 281 U. S.
497, 50 Sup. Ct. 356 (1929) (the Supreme Court upheld taxation, as a part of
the donor's estate, of another selected class of gifts inter vivos estates by the
entirety donated by one spouse for the benefit of both, although the gift was
not testamentary, and neither title, possession, nor enjoyment passed at death) ;
Milliken v. U. S., 283 U. S. 15, 51 Sup. Ct. 324 (1930) (a selected class of gifts
inter zivos, which were not testamentary, although made in contemplation of
death, were so taxed as a part of the donor's estate). Similar taxation of gifts
made inter vivos, but finally effective only at death, was sustained in Reinecke
TAX COMMENT
in the Schlesinger case, "the classification of gifts was deemed to be
arbitrary under the Fourteenth Amendment ** * Here we are con-
cerned only with the Fifth Amendment." 35
The true basis for the minority opinion, however, was "the
difficulty of searching the motives and purposes of one who is dead,
the proofs of which, so far as they survive, are in the control of his
personal representative * * *," " and the tremendous loss in revenue
because of this difficulty, for which Justice Stone elaborately and
profusely gives statistics.
3 7
It is respectfully submitted that the majority opinion is correct
in its position that a death transfer tax was intended by section
302 (c) and it was therefore unconstitutional, but that the minority
is on entirely sound ground in its declaration that a tax on pure gifts
inter vivos, if enacted to remedy a serious situation, would be entirely
valid. The true solution to the problem is more likely to be in, a
revision of section 302 (c), clearly expressing that a tax on pure
gifts inter vivos is intended, rather than in a return to its forerunners,
in view of the proven inutility of the latter.38
THEODORE S. WECKER.
STATE TAXATION OF FEDERAL INSTRUMENTALITIES-FEDERAL
TAXATION OF STATE INSTRUMENTALITIES.-In McCulloch v. Mary-
land, the Supreme Court declared that the constitutionally granted
powers of the federal government were not subject to regulation or
control by the states through the exercise of their taxing powers.1
v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U. S. 339, 49 Sup. Ct. 123 (1928) ; Chase National
Bank v. U. S., 278 U. S. 327, 49 Sup. Ct. 126 (1928) ; see Taft v. Bowers, 278
U. S. 470, 49 Sup. Ct. 199 (1928).
It is submitted that a ruling of the Supreme Court in the future to the
effect that a tax is invalid if intended to embrace gifts inter vivos would involve
overruling the above cases.
' Supra note 6, 52 Sup. Ct. at 365.
' Ibid. 52 Sup. Ct. at 367.
' Ibid. 52 Sup. Ct. at 367, 368.
"Supra note 4. Section 302 (c) has been amended by the REv. ACT OF
1932, tit. VI, §803. In part, this section reads as follows:
"Sec. 803 (a) (Section 302 (c) * * * is amended to read as follows:-
"I(c) * * * any transfer of a material part of his property in the
nature of a final disposition or distribution thereof, made by the decedent
within two years prior to his death without such consideration, shall,
unless shown to the contrary, be deemed to have been made in contem-
plation of death * * *.' " (Italics ours.)
'17 U. S. 316 (1819). See also Osborn v. Bank of U. S., 22 U. S. 738
(1824); Weston v. Charleston, 27 U. S. 449 (1829); Dennis v. First National
Bank of Great Falls, 55 Mont. 448, 178 Pac. 580 (1919); Chase National Bank
of New York v. Spokane County, 125 Wash. 1, 215 Pac. 374 (1923). See also
Powell, Indirect Encroachmnent on Federal Authority by the Taxing Power of
the States (1919) 31 CoL. L. Rv. 321.
